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REFUGEE IDENTITY AND THE
INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW
Tara Elizabeth Peters
Supervised by Professor Usha Natarajan
ABSTRACT
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol are
among the most widely ratified international treaties, but questions about who is a
refugee remain far from straightforward. This thesis reexamines the assumption that
international refuge law (IRL) identifies the most vulnerable of international migrants
and is necessary and helpful for their protection. Rather than providing suggestions
for legal reform, the purpose of my research is to challenge foundational assumptions
about the law in an effort to move the debate toward more useful directions. To better
understand the construction, use, and resulting consequences of the term refugee, this
thesis has two research questions. First, I ask how refugees describe their own
identity and whether it correlates with the Convention definition. The thesis begins
by outlining how migrants and refugees are defined according to international law and
reviews the specific historical context that led to the development of the refugee
definition. Using insights from multidisciplinary academic research, field research
with refugees, and my own fieldwork, I then synthesize six themes of how refugees
perceive the term refugee, their own identity, and international law. Second, I ask
how international refugee law influences our understanding of who deserves
international protection by exploring three themes in constructing refugee identity: the
relationship between ordinary and legal language, the advantages and disadvantages
of a group refugee identity, and the complicated relationship between law and
politics. I conclude by emphasizing the importance of asking fundamental questions
before trying to strengthen or revise IRL, including whether the refugee definition is
just. I suggest that, as actors within IRL, we should incorporate multi-disciplinary
analyses and methodologies into research and scholarship and make a commitment to
ensuring that refugee voices are heard.
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I. Introduction
When I conducted training sessions for new volunteers at our local refugee
resettlement office in the Chicago suburbs,1 I asked participants to share the images or
words that came to mind when they heard the word “refugee.” Refugee camp, poor,
desperate, African – all were typical answers, often recognized stereotypes or
assumptions about refugees. The word refugee is used frequently, particularly in the
media: we read about refugee camps after the earthquake in Haiti,2 “African drought
victims creat[ing] world’s largest refugee camp,”3 and neighboring countries
struggling with the “Syrian refugee influx.”4 Despite frequent use of the term, most
of these individuals are not considered refugees under international law, which only
protects individuals that are persecuted for particular reasons and in particular
circumstances.5

1

The United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) is “an interagency effort involving a
number of governmental and non-governmental partners both overseas and in the United States” to
admit approved refugees for permanent resettlement in the United States. These partners include nine
non-governmental organizations, including the local resettlement office noted above that “provide[s]
resettlement assistance and services to arriving refugees.” The number of refugees admitted to the
United States varies each year, but a “Presidential Determination establishes the overall admissions
levels and regional allocations of all refugees for the upcoming fiscal year.” See United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services, Humanitarian, Refugees & Asylum, Refugees, at
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextchannel
=385d3e4d77d73210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextoid=796b0eb389683210VgnVCM1000
00082ca60aRCRD (last visited Dec. 6, 2012) for specific information about USRAP. For example, the
Presidential Determination was set at 80,000 arrivals in federal fiscal year (FY) 2010 and 2011, but
actual arrivals were 73,311 and 56,424, respectively. See U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration, Statistics, http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/statistics/index.htm (last
visited Oct. 25, 2012) for more specific statistics. See U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Population,
Refugees and Migration, http://www.state.gov/j/prm/index.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2012) for more
general information about the U.S. refugee program.
2
See, e.g., U.N. condemned over ‘appalling’ Haiti earthquake camps, BBC News, Oct. 7, 2010, at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11491537 (“UN agencies in charge of refugee camps
for victims of Haiti's earthquake are inexperienced and dysfunctional, the US charity Refugees
International says.”).
3
E.g., Lisa Friedman, African Drought Victims Create World’s Largest Refugee Camp, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 22, 2011, at http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/08/22/22climatewire-african-drought-victimscreate-worlds-larges-97673.html.
4
E.g., Lyse Doucet, Jordan struggles with Syrian refugee influx, BBC News, Aug. 3, 2010, at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19107575.
5
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 1950 [hereinafter Refugee
Convention]. See infra II.A for an explanation of how a refugee is defined according to international
law.
1

I used to think this disconnect between “the more expansive public
understanding”6 of the word refugee and its legal definition7 was primarily a problem
of ignorance or lack of education. The media and public simply did not know or
understand the legal definition. Refugee situations were unique compared to other
migrants, and we had the definition to prove it. Yet the more I learn about the causes
of migration, the more I see that refugees and migrants often leave their countries of
origin for similar reasons. The distinction is not always as clear as the legal definition
implies. Now I believe that the difference between perception and law reflects a more
fundamental problem rooted in the refugee definition itself and the international
system that created and perpetuates it.
As a practitioner within this system, I had many informal discussions with
refugees over the years about their history, adjustment, and identity. Some
individuals called themselves refugees years after their initial resettlement, others
wanted to distinguish themselves from the label and from other refugees who were
not like them, and still others preferred to be called friends instead of refugee clients.
I often wondered if the term refugee was or could be accurate or helpful, given the
diversity among refugee populations. As I learned more about international refugee
law, I also wondered if refugees understood their own experience in the same way
that international law defined it. Although international law recognized refugees as
exceptional cases deserving international protection, it seemed that the refugee’s
experience – from situations that forced them to leave their home country, to flight to
a new country, and then usually years of waiting and interviews – was very
disempowering. I observed that refugees were treated as victims or research subjects
more often than they were viewed as individuals who could give valuable input into
the legal regime and policies that affected their own lives.
In order to better understand the construction and use of the term “refugee,” as
well as the resulting consequences, my thesis has two research questions. First, I ask
how refugees describe their own identity and whether it correlates with the
Convention definition. To explore this question, I analyze research studies that
6

Donald M. Kerwin, The Faltering US Protection System: Legal and Policy Responses to Refugees,
Asylum Seekers, and Others in Need of Protection, Migration Policy Institute 3 (2011) at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/refugeeprotection-2011.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
7
Here I am referring to the term “refugee” both as a definition under international refugee law and an
official immigration category and status in the United States.
2

involve refugee participants. Much of the existing research with refugees occurs
primarily in disciplines outside of international refugee law (IRL) and tends to focus
on integration and adjustment in host societies. While some of these findings can be
applied to my research question, I also conducted eleven interviews with fourteen
refugees to directly explore perceptions of identity and ideas about IRL. Although the
sample in my fieldwork was not large enough to draw generalizable conclusions,
these interviews are used as an addition to the existing research and literature. As
discussed in this thesis, the making and application of IRL rarely prioritizes or
considers input from refugees themselves. Thus, including these perspectives,
however briefly, is also an important symbolic step toward addressing this
shortcoming.
Building on my fieldwork and existing literature about refugee identity, my
second research question asks how IRL, and the refugee that it defines, influences our
understanding of who deserves international protection. I examine this question by
comparing refugee responses and synthesizing academic studies and research on IRL.
My research reexamines the assumption that IRL identifies the most vulnerable of
international migrants and is necessary and helpful for their protection.8 Rather than
providing suggestions for legal reform, the purpose of my research is to challenge
foundational assumptions about the law so we can first ensure that we are asking the
right questions.
In Part II, this thesis outlines how migrants and refugees are defined according
to international law. Reviewing the specific historical context that led to the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, I emphasize that
the refugee definition was developed in a specific context for a specific purpose. I
highlight the dominant role of IRL in refugee studies scholarship and identify the
primary critiques of IRL by mainstream scholars, classifying their position as one of
realistic resignation: they acknowledge that IRL is flawed but maintain it is a
necessary means to make the most out of an unfortunate situation.
Part III incorporates refugee voices by using multidisciplinary studies and my
fieldwork to outline six key themes of how refugees perceive the term refugee, their
own identity, and international law. Refugees generally understand the idea of
8

Key examples of what I will refer to as mainstream scholarship and assumptions are found in the
works of Guy Goodwin-Gill and James C. Hathaway. See infra, II.D.
3

refugee to fit their own experience and have a very negative perception of the term.
Their experiences are broad and diverse and difficult to capture under a single label.
While most do not know the specific language of the legal refugee definition, some of
their behavior and expectations have been influenced and shaped by IRL and the
refugee regime.
Part IV examines the relationship between refugee self-perception and IRL to
explore how and to what extent refugee identity is constructed by law. Using the
themes from refugees’ perspectives in the previous chapter, I identify three
corresponding themes in constructing refugee identity: the relationship between
ordinary and legal language, the advantages and disadvantages of a group refugee
identity, and the complicated relationship between law and policies.
Part V concludes by exploring implications of constructing a refugee identity.
Paradoxically, even though IRL impacts every stage of a refugee’s migration
experience and singles them out as deserving special protection, most refugees do not
feel special in any positive way. I emphasize the importance of asking fundamental
questions before trying to strengthen or revise IRL, including whether the refugee
definition is just and how to address the root causes of refugee situations. Finally, I
suggest that, as actors within IRL, we should incorporate multi-disciplinary analyses
and methodologies into research and scholarship and make a commitment to ensuring
that refugee voices are heard.

4

II. Refugees: Defined by International Law
A. Distinguishing Between Migrants and Refugees in International Law
Migration is often considered one of the “defining global issues”9 of this century, but
global migration is not a new phenomenon. Humans have moved throughout history
in search of food, shelter, livelihood, and security, with the birth of nation-states and
border control influencing migration in new ways in recent centuries.10 The number
of people living outside their country of birth reached a record 214 million in 2010,
although the proportion of migrants relative to the global population has remained at
around three percent for at least the past fifty years.11
There is no universally accepted international migrant definition, and the
distinctions between terms such as documented migrant, economic migrant, irregular
migrant, skilled migrant, and temporary migrant worker12 are not always clear.
According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the leading intergovernmental agency on migration, the term migrant is generally understood to mean
a person who chooses to leave his or her country of origin.13 The United Nations
(UN) definition distinguishes based on length of residence in a host or receiving
country: a migrant “has resided in a foreign country for more than one year
irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the means, regular or
irregular, used to migrate,” thus eliminating those who have traveled for short-term
purposes like tourism or business.14 The Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) specifically distinguishes between an economic migrant, who
“voluntarily leaves his country and takes up residence elsewhere” for a variety of
9

International Organization for Migration, http://www.iom.int/cms/home (last visited Nov. 9, 2012).
An in-depth analysis is outside the scope of this thesis, but some of the factors that IOM lists for
increased migration include the growth of the nation-state and border control, transatlantic travel which
makes it easier for migrants to travel further and faster, technology which facilities communication
among migrant networks, and global circumstances such as environmental disasters or more
destructive wars that push people to leave their countries.
10
See AARON SEGAL, AN ATLAS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, 3-22 (Hans Zell Publishers 1993) for
an overview of historical and modern migration movements.
11
See International Organization for Migration, About Migration, http://www.iom.int/cms/aboutmigration (last visited Oct. 25, 2012) for facts, figures, and definitions about international migration
[hereinafter IOM].
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
5

different economic reasons, and a refugee who was forced to leave, though it
acknowledges that the distinction may be blurred.15 The term migrant also often
refers to temporary or seasonal workers who travel to another country to work.16 In
this thesis, I use the term migrant in the broadest sense, referring to a person who has
left her or his country of origin, regardless of cause of departure or means of entry
into a secondary country. I exclude individuals traveling for short-term tourism,
study, or business purposes.
With the complexity of causes and means of migration, perhaps it is not
surprising that there is no single international law defining or regulating migration.
Debates about migration management typify the tension in public international law
between the rights of sovereign states and universal values such as individual human
rights law.17 The factors and perspectives surrounding issues of migration are
complex and often political. Though often reduced to domestic entry regimes and
border control, migration regulation can and does come in many different forms
through international law and policies regarding security, economics, environment,
labor and trade.18
As international human rights law developed in the last half of the twentieth
century, scholars and practitioners also started applying rights-based principles to
advocate for just treatment of migrants.19 While the existing international human
rights instruments apply equally to citizens and non-citizens, migrants are often more
vulnerable to discrimination and exploitation. Some scholars argue that additional
15

UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, (f) 62 – 64, HCR/IP/4/REV.1,
January 1999 [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook on RSD].
16
IOM, supra note 11.
17
As another example of this tension between sovereignty and universal values, the increasingly
popular language and doctrine of “responsibility to protect” argues that the international community
has a responsibility to protect certain values and rights, even when they are violated within a sovereign
state, the basic building block of public international law. Martti Koskenniemi used the terms
“ascending” and “descending” to describe these two approaches to public international law: the
ascending justification for international order starts with the state as its base and moves up and out,
while descending “trace[s] down to justice, common interest, progress, nature of the world
community… [which] are anterior, or superior, to State behavior, will or interest.” MARTI
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 59
(Cambridge University Press, Reissue 2005) (1989).
18
See, e.g., T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, International Legal Norms on Migration: Substance Without
Architecture, in RYSZARD CHOLEWINSKI, RICHARD PERRUCHOUD, AND EUAN MACDONALD,
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW: DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND KEY CHALLENGES 467 – 479
(T.M.C. Asser Press) (2007) (Aleinikoff outlines three broad approaches to law and international
migration: regulation of labor flows, human rights approach, and focus on state security).
19
Id. at 469.
6

legal instruments are needed to specifically protect migrant rights.20 The most notable
international effort to date is the International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW), which
entered into force on July 1, 2003.21 The ICRMW does not create new rights for
migrants, but defines different types of migrants and outlines rights and protection
they should enjoy in host countries according to existing international human rights
law. Only 35 countries have ratified the ICRMW22 and most of these are primarily
migrant-sending countries, demonstrating the lack of political will or sense of urgency
within the international community to specifically address migration in international
law.
International refugee law concerns a specific type of migrant. More
specifically, a refugee is one type of forced migrant. The term refugee is defined in
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The
Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol is one of the most widely ratified
international agreements with 145 parties to the Convention as of November 2012.23
Article 1(A)(2) defines the refugee as any person who:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having
a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return
to it.24
The refugee definition contains five key components: alienage, persecution, nexus to
one of the five protected grounds, well-founded fear, and state protection. Similar to
20

Id.at 471–479.
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Families, G.A. res. 45/158, 18 December 1990.
22
These countries include Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad,
Chile, Comoros, Congo, El Salvador, Gabon, Ghana, Guatamala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia,
Jamaica, Lesotho, Liberia, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Palau, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkey, and Venezuela.
Complete and current lists are available at United Nations Treaty Collections,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-13&chapter=4&lang=en
(last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
23
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 31 January 1967 [hereinafter 1967
Protocol].
24
Refugee Convention, supra note 5, at art. 1(A)2. In this thesis, the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees will collectively be
referred to as the “Refugee Convention” or “Convention” unless otherwise noted.
21

7

other international laws, the definition appears clear in the Convention text, but the
interpretation and application is both challenging and controversial. In order to be
recognized as a refugee, an individual must be outside the boundaries of his or her
country of origin or place of habitual residence. This distinguishes him or her from
an internally displaced person25 and is the clearest part of the refugee definition. The
other four components are more complex, which I outline briefly below.
Second, a refugee fears returning to his or her country of origin because of
persecution. The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status acknowledges that there is no universally accepted definition of
persecution.26 The meaning of the term has evolved over time from its initial
“[premise] on the risk of serious harm” to influential IRL scholars later categorizing
persecution in four ascending orders corresponding with the generations of
international human rights.27 Persecution is further differentiated from prosecution,
discrimination, or harassment.28 Stronger refugee claims also demonstrate “sustained
or systemic persecution” over “isolated incidents”29 of persecution.
Third, a refugee fears persecution on account of at least one of the five
protected grounds in the definition: race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion. As with other categories in international
law,30 domestic jurisdictions have interpreted and applied these categories differently.
Over the years, case law, IRL scholarship and UNHCR guidelines have further
defined and developed each of these five categories.31 Race and nationality are the
25

According to the UNHCR website, “internally displaced people, or IDPs, are often wrongly called
refugees. Unlike refugees, IDPs have not crossed an international border to find sanctuary but have
remained inside their home countries. Even if they have fled for similar reasons as refugees (armed
conflict, generalized violence, human rights violations), IDPs legally remain under the protection of
their own government - even though that government might be the cause of their flight. As citizens,
they retain all of their rights and protection under both human rights and international humanitarian
law.” UNHCR, Who We Help, Internally Displaced People, www.unhcr.org,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c146.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
26
UNHCR Handbook on RSD, supra note 15, at art. 51.
27
JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, Butterworths 103 (1991) [hereinafter
HATHAWAY, LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS].
28
Id. at 99–134.
29
Id.
30
For example, in international criminal law, the prohibited act of genocide must be directed against
one of four “protected” categories: national, ethnical, racial, and religious groups. See RICHARD
CRYER ET AL, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, Cambridge
University Press 169–173 (2007).
31
See UNHCR Handbook on RSD, supra note 15, at par. 66–86 for interpretation guidelines on the
five grounds. In case law, the Matter of Kasinga was a well-known and important landmark case in
1996, particularly because of how the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) defined a “particular
8

clearest grounds, with race including ethnicity and nationality including cultural or
linguistic groups, such as Kurds in Iraq or Eritreans in Ethiopia. Religion is more
challenging and fluid. It includes a set of ideas, beliefs, or freedom of conscience; it
also includes the freedom to change beliefs and the right to practice such beliefs.32
Political opinion can be an actual or imputed opinion33 and is challenging to prove,
with IRL scholars often arguing that it should be interpreted more broadly. Particular
social group is the most nebulous ground, but generally means a recognizable group
in society with similar “background, habits, or social status.”34
Fourth, a refugee’s fear of returning to his country of origin because of
persecution based on one of the five grounds is further distinguished as a wellfounded fear. The UNHCR guidebook notes that in order for a fear to be considered
well-founded, it should have both subjective and objective elements. The subjective
includes the asylum seeker’s feeling of fear, while the objective element is based on
the individual’s circumstances and in light of verifiable information about conditions
within the country.35 Many scholars have criticized the subjective-objective test,
emphasizing instead the probability of future persecution.36
Fifth and finally, a refugee does not enjoy state protection from the
persecution that she or he fears. The state may actually be the agent of persecution, or
the state may lack the capacity or willingness to protect certain individuals or groups
from persecution.37 There is some debate among scholars about whether this
constitutes a fifth element to the definition or is simply implied within the other
elements.38
In addition to defining a refugee, the Convention also outlines the “rights and
duties of refugees in their country of refuge” and specific duties for states to
social group” (unmarried women who oppose the practice of FGM and have not undergone the
procedure) and its determination that “the practice of female genital mutilation . . . can be the basis for
a claim of persecution.” See BIA (U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals). 1996. In re Fauziya Kasinga.
21 I&N Dec. 357.
32
UNHCR Handbook on RSD, supra note 15, at par. 71–73.
33
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW, A READER 45 (B.S. Chimni, ed., Sage Publications) (2000).
34
UNHCR Handbook on RSD, supra note 15, at par. 77–79, or generally UNHCR, Guidelines on
International Protection: "Membership of a Particular Social Group" Within the Context of Article
1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (2002),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
35
See The Michigan Guidelines on Nexus to a Convention Ground, University of Michigan Law
School, Int’l Ref. L., 25 March 2001.
36
Id.
37
UNHCR Handbook on RSD, supra note 15, at par. 65.
38
Id.
9

implement the Convention.39 Article 42 lists the articles from which state parties
cannot derogate, including articles (1) refugee definition, (3) non-discrimination, (4)
freedom of religion, (16[1]) access to courts, (33) prohibition of expulsion or return,
“refoulement,” and (36 – 46, inclusive) administrative.40 The principle of nonrefoulement in Article 33(1) is a cornerstone of IRL that was formalized even prior to
the 1951 Convention.41 It specifies, “No Contracting State shall expel or return
(“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”42
A person is a refugee as soon as he or she has fulfilled the criteria laid out in
the Convention. Thus, a successful refugee status determination does not make
someone a refugee, but simply declares what is already the case under international
law.43 Unless otherwise noted, in this thesis I use the term refugee to mean an
individual who meets the Convention’s definition.
B. Retracing the History of International Refugee Law44
The refugee definition and Convention is the starting place for analysis and critique in
most IRL scholarship. The history of IRL is used as background information,
simplified as if it developed naturally and slowly progressed through the early
twentieth century until culminating with the 1951 Convention and Protocol.45 In the
mid-1990s, a number of scholars started to re-examine the detailed history of
international refugee law, presumably in light of the end of the Cold War and
changing Cold War dynamics that had impacted refugee status determinations in the
39

Id. at par. 12.
Refugee Convention, supra note 5, at art. 42.
41
JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, Cambridge
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preceding years. These scholars are important because they challenge the mainstream
perception that IRL is continually, and even increasingly, relevant. A closer
examination of the history of IRL underscores that the Convention was written in a
specific historical context, in response to a particular event in Europe, and only later
extended to the rest of the world. Like all international law, it also demonstrates the
fundamental role that politics and competing worldviews played in creating the
international refugee regime that exists today.46
Two influential pieces examining IRL history are Loescher’s 1996 article47
and Barnett’s 2002 article.48 Barnett argues that the international refugee regime
incorporates all elements of international relations, including politics, economics, and
ideology and has “evolved with our modern state system” since the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648.49 Loescher argues that the “causes and dimensions of the refugee
problem”50 changed radically between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as
military technology developed and became capable of wider scales of destruction and
displacement and the numbers and strength of nation-states increased. Later in the
century, transatlantic flights and global communication also multiplied the speed and
distance migrants could travel. Barnett and Loescher both note that, until the
twentieth century, “there was no international protection for refugees as we know it
today.”51
1. The Interwar Period and the League of Nations
After the end of World War I, the League of Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (HCR) was established as a temporary agency for Russian refugees who
fled the country after the Revolution in 1917,52 had their citizenship revoked by the
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Soviet Union and had exhausted the limited humanitarian aid available throughout
Europe.53 Led by Fridtjof Nansen, the famous Norwegian explorer, the HCR
approached the refugee situation in Europe by directly negotiating with states for
creative solutions. A key example of this was the “Nansen passports,” which were
special identification documents created for stateless Russians. Recognized by
European states as a result of Nansen’s negotiations, these documents allowed the
stateless Russians to travel between countries.54 But because the refugee situation
was seen as temporary, 55 the HCR did not try to create any type of universal
definition of refugee but rather used a “category-oriented approach” to provide
assistance based on “group affiliation and origin.”56 The ultimate goal of the HCR
was repatriation,57 based on the assumption that all refugees wanted to return home.
Although Nansen succeeded in helping with limited projects like travel
documents, his influence over long-term solutions for displaced persons was limited
by several factors. First, the HCR operated on ad hoc budgets from donor states, and
agencies gave conditional and temporary funds, making it very hard to plan or
provide consistent assistance.58 Second, politics between governments severely
limited regional cooperation.59 Governments disagreed about the causes of refugee
movements and hesitated to create a universal definition for fear of ruining diplomatic
relations if they accepted refugees from certain countries, particularly political
dissidents from the Great Powers.60 The League of Nations was also generally
limited because neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. – the growing superpowers at the
time – were members.61
After Nansen died in 1930, the “international regime he had almost singlehandedly established proved totally incapable of dealing with the problem of Jewish
refugees.”62 The next decade was marked by a series of state attempts to create a
refugee definition and manage the situation. The 1933 Convention Relating to the
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International Status of Refugees defined refugee status based on lack of protection or
non-nationality, while the 1938 Convention on the Status of Refugees Coming From
Germany limited the definition to exclude those leaving Germany for personal
convenience.63 Attempts at international cooperation reached a new low at the failed
Evian Conference in France in 1938. The conference was convened by U.S. President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt at the request of Jews leaving Germany to consider
options for permanent resettlement. However, governments refused to finance
resettlement or change their immigration quotas and failed to convince Germany to
allow Jews to leave with their personal resources, thus severely limiting their ability
to resettle anywhere outside of Germany.64
Throughout the 1930s, the politicization of refugee situations in Europe
continued to grow. The problems were exacerbated by the Great Depression as states
were unwilling to “take on new financial obligations,”65 including direct assistance to
refugees or funding HCR agencies and activities. In 1936, the new HCR
commissioner, James MacDonald, resigned due to frustration with the severe
limitations of his role and agency and the lack of political will from states to
cooperate on refugee issues.66 In his resignation letter, he “referred to the need to set
aside state sovereignty in favor of humanitarian imperatives” and to search for
solutions “at the level of international politics.”67 Even though MacDonald and the
HCR were unsuccessful in making permanent policy changes, the work in the 1920s
and 1930s left a “lasting and important legacy” on states that would eventually lead to
the 1951 Convention. Refugees now “constituted victims of human rights abuses for
whom the world had a special responsibility.” 68
2. World War II and the International Refugee Organization (IRO)
Following World War II, Europe experienced a “new period of upheaval,”69
sometimes referred to as “one of the greatest population movements in history.”70 An
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estimated thirty million people needed assistance and a place to settle permanently,
including soldiers and displaced persons who could not return to their countries.71
The League of Nations was dissolved at the end of the war, and in November 1943,
the Allies created the United Nations Relief and Reconstruction Agency (UNRRA).
Established to provide assistance to all who were displaced by the war, UNRRA
aimed to “[return] them home as soon as possible” regardless of their individual
preference.72 Approximately 75 percent of those displaced by the war were
repatriated en masse by UNRRA within the first five months after the war.73 Many
who had been displaced by World War II were put into Stalin’s work camps upon
their return.74 This became the start of an ongoing struggle between the East and
West as refugees were viewed as political dissidents and potential threats;
furthermore, “repatriation touched on the ideological conflicts” that divided the two
superpowers.75
Cold War tensions eventually ruined UNRRA’s mission,76 and failure was
inevitable once the U.S. threatened to discontinue funding at the end of its mandate in
1947.77 In 1948, the United Nations created the International Refugee Organization
(IRO) as a temporary intergovernmental agency with a mission to “regularize the
status of the Second World War’s refugees”78 by focusing on group resettlement
instead of mass repatriation.79 As a result of the IRO’s efforts and support from the
West, more than one million European refugees were resettled to the Americas, Israel,
Southern Africa and Oceania through negotiated agreements with various
governments.80 In need of labor, states established economic programs that allowed
individuals to immigrate with the promise of eventually obtaining citizenship. The
IRO also started to move away from the “category-oriented approach,” focusing on
individuals and case-by-case refugee status determinations.81 Eventually, however,
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many of the most vulnerable refugees were left (i.e. children, elderly, disabled)
without options for resettlement as states became more selective with their
employment and admission policies.82
The Soviet Union never joined the IRO, viewing it mostly as an extension of
the policies of the West.83 As Cold War tensions grew, Europe began to divide into
two blocks of allegiances, “pressed between the remains of one refugee crisis and the
emergence of another.”84 The U.S. government was concerned that “continued
reliance on the IRO would institutionalize the refugee problem,”85 particularly with
resettlement responsibilities falling to countries outside of Europe. Despite these
concerns, discussions began in the United Nations to create a new international
refugee organization, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), and to begin work toward an international convention on refugees.86
3. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
The transition between the IRO and the UNHCR was a pivotal time for the
international refugee regime. IRL scholarship tends to focus on debates between
states just prior to the Convention, including a justification for how persecution
became the “key definitional criterion in the Convention.”87 But the IRO played an
important and often overlooked role in shaping IRL. A 2011 article by Glynn traced
the “forgotten” role of the IRO, starting when the UN Secretary-General requested
that former IRO members draft a Convention text.88 Many of the IRO members
involved in creating this draft had worked on other refugee agreements and
conventions since 1921 and, notably, “had personal experiences of asylum.”89 Unlike
the Ad Hoc Convention Committee90 representatives who were more likely to be
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influenced by state interests or personal future employment goals, the former IRO
members produced a convention draft with the refugee definition and protection being
“as universal as possible.”91 The UN secretariat submitted the proposal to the
Committee but did not disclose that former IRO members had been involved, in order
to limit opposition to the text.92
Within the Committee, there was great debate about how universal the refugee
definition should be. France and the UK generally favored a broader refugee
definition based on the right to seek and enjoy asylum in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,93 while the U.S. favored a definition that limited the groups who
qualified as refugees.94 To the internal “dismay” and “horror” of the former IRO
members,95 the Convention working group decided to restrict the refugee definition to
“those persons whose persecution or fear of persecution is due to events in Europe
after the outbreak of the Second World War and before July 1, 1950.”96 Some
countries justified the time and location restrictions of the proposed text, while others
pushed for a universal definition. The U.S. took a pragmatic stance by arguing that
this convention was a first step, and Arab states supported the location limitation
believing that the Palestinian interests they sought to protect would be served better
by separate agencies.97 Great Britain “led the way” among mostly European states for
a broader definition, while Canada and Switzerland strove to find a balance between
the “Europeanists” and “universalists.”98 As the debates continued, France’s
representative changed its position due to political calculations99 and followed the
American position, suggesting that “only Europe ‘was ripe for the treatment of the
refugee problem on an international scale.”100 The Convention that resulted on July
25, 1951 drew heavily from legal instruments over previous centuries, including the
concept of applying for asylum in the French Constitution of 1793, individual
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persecution in the 1905 British Aliens Act, and an inability to return to a country of
origin from the League of Nations definition in the 1920s.101
The UN General Assembly hosted the convention plenipotentiaries in Geneva
in 1951 which included delegates from 26 states, two observer states, nongovernmental organizations and international organizations.102 In addition to
maintaining refugee status for those recognized under earlier instruments, the
Convention text defined a refugee as any person who “as a result of events occurring
before 1 January 1951” is outside his country of origin and unable or unwilling to
return due to a well-founded fear of persecution based on one of the five protected
grounds.103 The Convention also outlined reasons for exclusion or cessation of
refugee status, refugee rights and duties, and responsibilities of state parties. Only
nineteen countries ratified the Convention on 28 July 1951, and it entered into force
on 22 April 1954.104
C. The 1967 Protocol and Regional Refugee Definitions
Sixteen years later, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees removed the
geographic and temporal limitations of the refugee definition in the 1951 Convention.
As an amendment to the Convention, state parties to the 1967 Protocol also accept the
terms of the Convention.105 The Protocol entered into force on 4 October 1967 and
has since enjoyed wide ratification, with 146 state parties as of November 2012.106
The Convention and Protocol are considered the “centrepiece of international refugee
protection today”107 and references to the Convention generally also include its 1967
Protocol. To explain why the refugee definition was extended less than two decades
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after the initial convention, most scholars note that during this time the UN General
Assembly had asked the UNHCR “to assist refugees who did not come fully within
the statutory definition.”108 As these requests continued, it was a logical and
eventually mandated move to extend the Convention to cover non-European refugees
from other time periods.
Another factor that led to the wide ratification of the Protocol was the political
events occurring in Africa at the same time. Following decolonization, newly
independent countries in Africa were in the process of forming a continental
organization, the Organization for African Unity (OAU), with the primary goals of
increased unity and protected independence across the continent.109 In 1964, the
OAU mandated the Commission of Ten on Refugees to draft a text for a convention,
adopted by the OAU five years later on September 10, 1969.110 The OAU refugee
definition included the 1951 Convention refugee definition, as well as a unique
component that could be applied more broadly than the individual claim to
persecution. The OAU refugee definition includes:
every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign
domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the
whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of
habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country
of origin or nationality.111
UN instruments point to the examples of regional definitions like the 1969 OAU
Convention to emphasize the importance of the 1951 Convention in serving as the
basis for other regional refugee definitions.112 But unlike the 1951 Convention, there

108

See GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL AND JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 – 25
(Oxford University Press, Third Edition, 2007) for specific examples, such as the mainland Chinese in
Honk Kong or Algerians in Morocco and Tunisia in the late 1950s.
109
The Organization for African Unity Charter was adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on May 25,
1963. Its main objectives were to “rid the continent of the remaining vestiges of colonization and
apartheid; to promote unity and solidarity among African States; to coordinate and
intensify cooperation for development; to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member
States and to promote international cooperation within the framework of the United Nations.” On
September 9, 1999, the OAU was replaced with a new organization, the African Union. The vision of
the African Union is that of: “An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens
and representing a dynamic force in global arena.” African Union, About Us,
http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell (last visited Aug. 13, 2012).
110
RACHEL MURRAY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA, Cambridge University Press 186 (2004).
111
1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problem in Africa, 1001
U.N.T.S. 45, at art. 2.
112
For example, the UNHCR Frequently Asked Questions about the 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol state: “these instruments helped inspire important regional instruments such as the 1969 OAU
18

are few travaux préparatoires and other public records available from the OAU
Convention.113 In one of the few pieces to actually acknowledge this important lack
of primary sources, Okoth-Obbo noted that research on the African refugee definition
is often limited to authors’ interpretations of the motives behind the Convention.114
Unfortunately these subjective and second-hand accounts have become the
“established mantra for analysis”115 in IRL scholarship.
The mainstream thesis that the OAU definition developed in response to the
belief that the 1951 Convention was irrelevant to Africa is a “gross overstatement and
misrepresentation of the true position.”116 Though the 1951 Convention did not cover
refugees in Africa when the OAU Committee started working on a convention in
1964, it is also unclear whether the Committee initially believed the definition was
appropriate for an African context.117 The OAU not only disagreed with the
individual nature and time limitations of the 1951 Convention,118 but it also wanted
the African definition to cover freedom fighters and those involved in colonial
struggles.119 According to Africa expert Rachel Murray, the Committee reportedly
considered establishing a regional High Commissioner for Refugees, but ultimately
decided this seemed to conflict with the intended universality of UNHCR. Instead,
UNHCR assisted with writing the OAU definition.120 Few scholars have noted that it
was only after the 1967 Protocol was signed and ratified that the OAU decided to use
the 1951 Convention definition as part of its definition.121 In other words, the
possibility of the more generous OAU refugee definition “competing with the already
familiar UN model” may have actually encouraged more Western countries to sign
the 1967 Protocol.122
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D. International Refugee Law Scholarship
Two scholars who have been highly influential in shaping contemporary refugee law
are Oxford professor Guy Goodwin-Gill and James Hathaway from the University of
Michigan. Goodwin-Gill has written one of the most widely-used texts on refugee
law, now in its third edition, which serves as “an authoritative statement of the current
law.” 123 The book’s approach reflects the mainstream framework of conceptualizing
IRL as necessary, though flawed, and in need of clarification and improvement.124
With a similar approach, Hathaway’s widely used text focuses on “the basis for the
choice of persecution as the key definitional criterion in the Convention.”125
In 2007, Hathaway reiterated this mainstream position in his aptly titled
address, “Why International Refugee Law Still Matters.”126 In a global context of
states adopting more restrictive immigration policies and refugee advocates becoming
increasingly critical of the international refugee regime, Hathaway holds that the
Convention is as important as ever. He argues that IRL is actually compatible with
state interests, not a threat as it is commonly understood to be.127 He does not
propose changing the refugee definition or rights to which refugees are entitled, but
says that the challenge comes with using the Convention definition flexibly at the
“operational level.”128 Hathaway admits that addressing the causes of refugee flows
is important, but believes it is impossible to stop all human rights abuses that cause
refugee situations.
IRL is therefore an “imperfect but practical mechanism.”129 Both GoodwinGill and Hathaway are critical of IRL, but their critiques concern the ongoing
application, implementation and enforcement of the Convention, not its basic
premise.130 Hathaway claims that the “normative foundation of the Refugee
Convention remains sound and is a sufficient basis on which to build a revitalized
123

GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL AND JANE MCADAM, supra note 108, at viii.
Id. at vii. For example, the stated goal of the book is to describe “the foundations and the
framework of international refugee law by concentrating on three core issues: the definition of
refugees, the principle of non-refoulement, and the protection of refugees.”
125
HATHAWAY, LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 27, at 99–133.
126
James Hathaway, Why Refugee Law Still Matters, 8 Melb. J. Int'l L. 88 (2007) [hereinafter
Hathaway, Why Refugee Law Still Matters].
127
Id. at 99.
128
Id. at 98.
129
Id.
130
HATHAWAY, LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 27, at 99.
124

20

regime.”131 Zetter also sees the Convention as being threatened. His influential
article on “labeling refugees” is one of the most cited articles in this field.132 He
ultimately argues that re-examining the Convention threatens all of IRL and
jeopardizes protection for “true” refugees.133 The mainstream perspective seems to be
a position of realistic resignation: they acknowledge that we cannot address the causes
of all refugee situations and that IRL is flawed, but they remain determined to make
the most out of an unfortunate situation.
International refugee law has generally enjoyed the dominant position in
refugee-related discourse and policy discussions.134 Refugee studies is still a
relatively new but growing interdisciplinary field, with the establishment of the
Refugee Studies Centre at Oxford in 1982135 often referenced as the unofficial “birth”
of the discipline.136 In a 1991 article, Chimni offered a much-cited critique of IRL,137
emphasizing that IRL has long occupied centre stage in refugee studies. He argues
that refugees have been used as tools in policies by Western states since World War II
and calls for a reexamination of refugee studies in light of the “growing North-South
divide.”138 He calls attention to the “geopolitics of knowledge production in the field
of refugee studies,”139 arguing that there is a structural bias within IRL where research
questions come from the West and not from where most refugees are located.140
Furthermore, the international refugee system141 does not provide law and
policy-makers with opportunities for regular points of contact with refugees.
International law scholars rarely engage in fieldwork with refugees. This therefore
limits refugee input in IRL and influences our understanding of who deserves
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international protection. In the next section, I turn to other disciplines and my own
fieldwork to explore some of these missing refugee perspectives.
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III. Refugees: How They See Themselves and Their Experiences
I don’t like [the term refugee]. I think it’s the worst in society.
– participant 6, refugee from Burma/Myanmar142
Although international refugee law clearly defines a refugee, refugee voices are rarely
included in IRL scholarship and seldom influence the refugee regime.143 IRL is
typically made by legal and political representatives from states in consultation with
technocrats from international organizations, interpreted by judges and influential
legal scholars largely educated in the Western academy, applied by national
administrators and UNHCR in refugee status determinations, and reviewed by
domestic courts. It is hard to tell what refugees think about the law and policies that
shape their experience as their ideas are not typically heard. While this exclusion
could be partially due to many barriers that make it difficult for researchers to access
refugees,144 IRL also has not prioritized refugee perspectives in law-making or
scholarship.
Refugee studies gained momentum as a multidisciplinary field in the 1980s,
and scholars from different disciplines have expanded research questions to include
other aspects of refugee’s lives and experiences. Disciplines outside of law often
work directly with refugees through field research, thus prioritizing and incorporating
perspectives from those whose lives are most directly affected by IRL. There is now
142
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extensive information available about refugees, primarily those resettled in the U.S.,
Canada, Australia, and some European countries, and most of the research focuses on
adjustment and integration in these destination countries. The number of refugee
stories told through biographies, autobiographies, films, and other media has also
grown remarkably and increased the general public’s accessibility to refugee
narratives.145 But in spite of the growth of refugee research and literature, refugees
are still restricted primarily to the role of research subjects or aid beneficiaries.
In this chapter, I use insights from three sources – multidisciplinary academic
research, field research with refugees, and my own fieldwork – to synthesize themes
of how refugees perceive their identity and relate to IRL. The purpose of conducting
my own fieldwork was two-fold: first, to explore if refugees understood their
experience in the same way as IRL defined it and, second, to consciously include and
consider refugee voices in my thesis. My fieldwork included eleven semi-structured
interviews with refugees who were resettled in the Chicago suburbs under the United
States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP).146 The U.S. ratified the 1967
Protocol, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security uses the same refugee
definition when approving refugee cases for U.S. resettlement. Therefore, as resettled
refugees in the U.S., all participants had been admitted to the country under the
Convention refugee definition. This was a crucial criterion for my sample; I wanted
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to interview individuals who had been designated refugees according to IRL,
regardless of whether their country of origin was a party to the Refugee Convention
(most were not).
My field research consisted of eleven interviews with fourteen participants,
including eight men and six women.147 Four participants were originally from
Bhutan, four from Iraq, three from Burma/Myanmar, two from the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and one from Ethiopia. While not large enough to be a
representative sample, these demographics reflected the largest groups of refugees
being resettled in the U.S. in 2012.148 The interview results,149 in addition to insight
from other studies and research, revealed the following themes about how refugees
understand their identity and international law.
A. Refugees’ ideas of how to define “refugee” are generally based on their
personal experience.
During my interviews, I first asked participants to briefly describe why they left their
country of origin, where they went, if they intended to stay and then how long they
actually stayed. These are similar to the typical interview questions in a refugee
status determination or resettlement interview, and several participants asked me how
detailed they needed to be. Several also offered to show me proof of their story with
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various documents, which signaled to me their past experience of being required to
verify their identity and testimony. The purpose of these questions was not to focus
on details or evaluate the merit of a refugee claim, but rather to start with familiar
questions and hear if their self-described reasons for leaving aligned with the
Convention definition. Refugees described their reasons for leaving their countries of
origin with varying degrees of specificity, including: the political situation, a
perceived political opinion, marrying someone of another ethnicity, no security, a
military government, bombings and war, their unwillingness to convert, business
problems, unable to be a missionary, and safety. There were some consistent themes
among participants from the same country of origin: Bhutanese/Nepali150 refugees left
Bhutan because of the political situation where they did not have access to land or
citizenship, while Burmese left Burma/Myanmar because of the military government.
When I asked participants when they first heard the word refugee or learned
what a refugee was, I learned that all except two participants learned the word or idea
of refugee only after becoming one. One Iraqi man reported that he heard the word or
idea of “refugee” on television in Iraq,151 and another Iraqi couple stated that they had
heard of Palestinian refugees but did not realize the term applied to them until they
arrived in the U.S.152 The other eleven participants learned about the term in various
ways in their second or third countries of asylum: three Bhutanese learned while
growing up, talking to their parents, and living and attending school in refugee camps
in Nepal.153 Another Bhutanese man learned upon arriving at the camp and seeing the
sign “Bhutanese Refugee camp.”154 Four others learned from friends or people they
met in asylum countries who encouraged them to register as refugees. One Burmese
participant knew the term from the Bible to mean when someone’s “life is insecure”
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and they had to go to another country; he therefore realized he was a refugee after he
had left Burma/Myanmar and went to Malaysia.155
Most refugees conceptualized the idea of what it meant to be a refugee with
their own story and experience, not Convention terminology or categories. When I
asked participants to define or describe the word refugee in their own words, the nine
who answered this question included ideas that directly reflected their own
experience. All answers were broader than the Convention definition. All included
the idea of leaving, being forced to leave or evicted from their own country. Four
participants mentioned having no country or no one, while three expressed the idea
that a refugee is someone who really needs help. Other descriptions included
someone who is homeless, has no citizenship, fears for their life, has their human
rights abused, “they can live in their country but there is no food,”156 and feels
insecure and in danger. At various points in the interviews, three different
participants mentioned that refugees had existed in the Bible or at the time of Jesus or
Mohamed,157 indicating that the concept was an old one. A Congolese woman said
that when Abraham went to Egypt, “he’s refugee maybe because no food, maybe war,
and that go to refuge somewhere to get peace.”158
No one specifically mentioned the word persecution. Even without a legal
background, I expected some participants to be more familiar with refugee
terminology and definitions since they had been through extensive interviews before
being accepted to the U.S. resettlement program. When I asked participants how they
would define a refugee if they could write a new international definition, most
repeated the same ideas. Five included ideas that extend beyond the Convention
definition: a Bhutanese man acknowledged that people could become refugees other
ways,159 a Congolese man said a refugee is someone who is in trouble, “any kind of
trouble,” including leaving his country because of hunger,160 a Burmese woman said
refugees are people who really need help and agreed, when asked, that someone like a
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victim of Haiti earthquake who needs shelter could be considered a refugee,161 and an
Iraqi couple said that protection is the most important thing to consider for
refugees.162
Some refugee studies scholars and researchers have started to use the term
refugee in a broader context, despite its legal definition. For example, in Andrew
Shacknove’s influential article that asked who is a refugee, he argued that refugee
status should be granted to “persons whose governments fail to protect their basic
needs, who have no remaining recourse than to seek international restitution of these
needs, and are situated that international assistance is possible.”163 In Emma
Haddad’s work, she argued that refugees are the “intersection of the international and
the domestic”164 and used her own definition to describe “an individual who has been
forced, in significant degree, outside the domestic political community
indefinitely.”165 In an ethnographic study that I use later, researcher Lorraine Currie
used the term refugee “in its broadest sense at times to include ‘asylum-seekers’ and
‘displaced persons’ who are living in refugee-type situations.”166 This practice of
using or proposing modified refugee definitions may more closely align with the
media and public perception of the term refugee and also reflect shortcomings within
the legal definition.
B. Refugees do not like the term “refugee.”
Although I expected that refugees did not like the term refugee, based on personal
experience and anecdotal evidence, I was surprised at how strongly most felt about
the word. Few studies have directly explored refugees’ perception of the term itself,
and in my interviews it did not appear like refugees were asked this question very
often. When I asked participants what they thought or felt about the word refugee, it
evoked some of the strongest and most emotional responses of any of the questions.
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All participants answered immediately, appearing not to have to think about their
opinion or ideas.
Eleven did not like the term refugee at all. Several talked about how the term
made them feel: one said he “fe[lt] something inside right away”167 when he heard the
word refugee, another said it made him “quite uncomfortable,”168 and another said she
thought a refugee was the “worst in society” and so the word was “uncomfortable.”169
Others talked about the connotations associated with the word. A Bhutanese man said
being a refugee meant they had to depend on organizations for their life, and the local
people and citizens in Nepal “used to hate us.”170 Another said the word made him
“lower” and meant he didn’t “have freedom like others.”171 One Bhutanese couple
said they don’t want to be called homeless and so it hurt to be called a refugee.172
Another Burmese couple said it feels like people look down on refugees and it is “the
worst in human society so it feels not comfortable.”173 One Iraqi woman did not
answer the question directly, but implied a negative perception since she said it meant
that she “has no one.”174 A Congolese man emphasized that refugee means suffering
and expressed a desire to have a world without situations that create refugees.175
Only two participants were positive. One Congolese woman said that being a
refugee is good because it means that you get help.176 A different Iraqi woman, who
was positive throughout the entire interview, said there was “no shame” in being a
refugee; she explained that they had come to the U.S. because they needed help.177
The positive answers seemed more connected to the benefits associated with being a
refugee than to the word itself.
Several expressed the idea that being a refugee was the truth, regardless of
how they felt about it. A Burmese woman explained that even though she did not like
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the term, at some point she just had to “accept” that it was true.178 An Ethiopian man
described the same experience of how he came to accept a refugee identity:
If you are a refugee, you don’t like that word. It is quite uncomfortable. Even
somebody asks you, so, you are a refugee? I don’t like it. But because of who
I am, and it’s the truth, I just admit it. Yes, I am. I didn’t ever run from my
country because I steal or kill anybody… It happened because I tried to fight
something, some tiny thing that it may expose something… after the long run
you admit it, you swallow it. It is true. It’s not a nice word, in general.179
Two participants also commented on the positive differences between being called a
refugee in the U.S. compared to other countries of asylum. This was primarily
because in the U.S. they felt like they were treated equally at work, in society, and
simply “can live.”180 A Congolese man said that the perception of refugees varies
from country to country based on how the public understands and treats refugees.181
As I discussed perceptions of the term, starting from the first interview, this led me to
ask as a follow-up question: was there a difference between terms like refugee,
immigrant, migrant, or asylum-seeker? Was there a better term for refugee?
Of the thirteen asked this question, three said the terms sounded the same,182
two said they did not know,183 and one Bhutanese woman said the meaning is the
same, but the connotation is different. “When we listening it gives like a different
sense,” she explained. It “hurt” more to be called a refugee because refugees were
forced to move by the government.184 Seven participants thought that refugee and
immigrant had different meanings, with “immigrant” being the more positive term.
They understood immigrant to be someone with legal status in the U.S. who made a
choice to immigrate and had the ability to work or access to money and resources. A
few even asked me to clarify if their understanding of immigrant was correct.
One important limitation to note is the role that language and interpretation
could have played in the responses to these questions. Though participants seemed to
understand the question based on their quick responses, five interviews were
conducted with interpreters and English was the second or third language for
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participants who chose to be interviewed in English. While it is outside the scope of
this thesis to examine the translation of each of the terms and the possible meanings in
different languages and contexts, the English words still clearly had both positive and
negative connotations associated with them. And even though most refugees did not
like the term refugee, no one suggested or could think of a better word to use. Only
one Burmese woman said that she preferred the term “asylum seeker” to refugee.185
C. Refugee experiences are diverse and difficult to generalize under a common
label.
Though most refugees agreed that they did not like the word refugee, each of their
experiences as a refugee was different. While at a certain level we can understand
that each human experience is unique, categorization for analysis is almost inevitable.
Even in describing refugee self-perceptions, I realize that I may unintentionally, and
paradoxically, simplify the diversity of stories and experiences that I am trying to
represent. In addition to the insight from my fieldwork, theories and methodology
from other disciplines can offer helpful insights to understanding refugee perceptions
of their own identity. Some of the most influential figures in refugee studies have
been anthropologists186 and insights from this discipline in particular, which
emphasizes holistic understanding, are especially relevant to understanding refugee
conceptions of identity.
In a 1995 article, anthropologist Liisa Malkki criticized the idea of a shared
“refugee experience” that had been proposed by other researchers.187 She argued that
we cannot “claim to know, from the mere fact of refugeeness, the actual sources of a
person’s suffering.”188 By generalizing a refugee’s experience, she argued that
“refugee” becomes much more than a legal category. She reviewed literature that
described the refugee as a “culture, identity…or a community,”189 which is
problematic at the conceptual level as well as in practice where the tendency to group
185
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refugees into one experience has “real consequences for the shape of interventions in
refugee crises.”190 Mainstream IRL scholars disagree. Twelve years after Malkki’s
article was published, Hathway explicitly disagreed with her premise that there is too
much diversity in refugee’s experience to justify a common label. In an article where
he argued that refugee situations were too unique to be incorporated under the broader
category of forced migration studies, Hathaway maintained that a “common
international legal status … is more than enough” to unite refugees together.191 He
noted that in the “real world,” legal statuses “routinely identify and constitute
fundamental social and political categories,” citing the differences between citizens
and non-citizens as the “most obvious example.”192
But Shacknove argued that our assumptions about “who is a refugee” also
stem from assumptions about the relationship between states and citizens. He noted
that “in refugee policy circles, basic threats to the individual are usually divided into
three categories: persecution, vital (economic) subsistence, and natural calamities.”193
He argued further that persecution alone is a limited and incomplete category for
defining a refugee because it is only “one manifestation of a state’s failure to provide
for its citizen’s needs.”194 Shacknove’s work also showed that other migrants have
experienced a failure of state protection and the line between legal refugees and other
migrants is often blurred.
My research as well as my fieldwork, interviews, and experience with
refugees lead me to side with Malkki and Shacknove. Even among only fourteen
refugees, participants gave unique and diverse reasons for leaving their country,
decisions about where and how to go, and ideas for defining a refugee – all of which
could overlap with migrant definitions and reasons for leaving their countries. To get
a sense of how resettled refugees identified themselves, I asked participants how they
responded to the question “where are you from?” now that they lived in the Chicago
suburbs. Of the thirteen who were asked this question, twelve included their country
of origin in their response, but nine also included qualifiers. A Congolese woman and

190

Id.
James C. Hathaway, Debate: Forced Migration Studies: Could We Agree Just to ‘Date’? J. Ref.
Stud., 350 (2007) [hereinafter Hathaway, Forced Migration Studies].
192
Id.
193
Shacknove, supra note 163, at 278.
194
Id. at 274 – 284.
191

32

Iraqi couple said they responded their country of origin plus identified as a refugee,195
a Bhutanese man said Bhutan, Nepal where he lived for eighteen years, plus his
refugee status,196 a Burmese couple said both Burma/Myanmar and Malaysia,197 and
another Bhutanese couple said only Nepal because they left Bhutan as children.198
One Burmese woman said she did not like to admit that she was from
Burma/Myanmar and instead told people that she was from China.199
These responses indicate that resettled refugees still feel a strong connection to
their countries of origin despite the different reasons they had to leave. They also
show that their migration experience is still an important part of how they describe
their identity. This also coincides with Malkki’s argument that “the loss of
homeland” does not necessarily lead to a “loss of cultural identity.” 200 Malkki argues
that this assumption that culture is lost with exile or migration may explain why
cultural adjustment and mental health of refugees remain a focus of practitioners and
policy-makers. Assuming that all refugees have experienced particular kinds of
trauma or lost their cultural identity is inaccurate and disempowering. It also groups
them under one label and fails to acknowledge the unique experiences of each
individual.
D. Refugees are largely unaware of international refugee law and the processes
of the international refugee system.
Throughout my interviews, I learned that in most cases refugees were not aware of the
law or various processes of the international refugee system. From refugee status
determination to the legal refugee definition to resettlement decisions, refugees were
moved through the international refugee system without knowing the procedures,
understanding their options, or hearing how decisions about their case were made.
When I asked participants if they had been through a “refugee status
determination” process with UNHCR,201 none recognized the term. This does not
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necessarily mean that they had not been through the process; most understood the
question when I asked if they had “registered” as a refugee at some point. But it was
not clear that refugees understood the purpose of registering or whether they had a
choice to go through the process. Five participants heard about the registration
process through a friend or someone they met in their second or third country of
asylum, three Bhutanese said that they “had” to register because everyone
registered,202 three Burmese heard about ethnic community organizations (in lieu of
registration) from people of the same race/ethnicity,203 and one Iraqi woman said that
she intentionally went to a different country so that she could register with the UN.204
None seemed to be told directly why they were recognized as a refugee.
While this may be UNHCR policy in order to limit fraud, it also seemed to add to
refugees’ confusion and sense of disempowerment over their lives. When I asked
participants why they thought their case had been approved, an Iraqi man and
Bhutanese couple believed it was because their story was consistent or they had
proof,205 a Congolese man and woman thought it was because of the situation in their
home country,206 an Ethiopian man thought it was because a specific interviewer had
lived in Ethiopia and knew the situation there,207 and one Bhutanese man simply had
“no idea.”208 None of the participants seemed to connect their recognition as a
refugee with a pre-identified category or legal definition. Their understanding also
did not necessarily correlate with the stated reason they left their country. Some
participants also seemed to blur the process of RSD and resettlement applications. It
was difficult to tell if this was because the different processes were unclear or because
they viewed it all as one long application process.
Participants gave similar answers when I asked why they had applied for
resettlement and if they knew why they had been chosen. Only seven gave clear
answers to why they applied for U.S. resettlement: the four Bhutanese each said they
pursued resettlement because they had no future or life in the camp and “heard life
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was better outside,”209 the Ethiopian and Congolese men were referred by UNHCR
but did not seem to directly apply themselves,210 and one Iraqi woman described the
desperation of her situation as her motivation.211 Three believed they were accepted
because they were recognized by the UN or referred bb UNHCR, one because the
interviewers understood his home country situation, and one because of her difficult
situation. Furthermore, when asked if they knew any cases that had been denied and
why this might be, two speculated that perhaps the applicants were unable to explain
their case, and two said because some people gave inconsistent answers throughout
the interviews. These responses revealed that refugees understood the process to
emphasize credibility rather than meeting certain criteria.
All twelve refugees who were asked if they knew how international refugee
law defines a refugee clearly said “no.” Several participants thought I was referring
to laws concerning refugees, such as camp regulations, and one Bhutanese couple
thought I was referring to UNHCR durable solutions.212 One participant recognized
the definition after reading it and another – a former filmmaker and activist –
indicated that he had heard of the Refugee Convention and knew that Thailand, where
he was living, was not a party to the Convention.213 So while a few refugees had
learned some of the terminology of the refugee system, the idea of a legal refugee
definition still seemed unfamiliar. One particularly poignant response summarized
the paradoxical nature of my question. After talking about his ideas of what a refugee
is and then being asked if he knew the legal refugee definition, one Bhutanese man
said, “I really don’t know, but I know what is [a] refugee.”214
After I asked refugees if they knew the legal refugee definition, I gave them a
piece of paper with the written Convention refugee definition. We read the legal
definition together, and I briefly explained the components of the definition.
Participants generally agreed that the definition made sense and fit their situation,
which is not surprising given that all had been resettled through USRAP under the
same definition. When pushed to consider whether the definition was good or bad,
too broad or narrow, or was missing anything, one Bhutanese man said nothing was
209
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missing,215 another Bhutanese man and couple said it was maybe too big, long, or
broad,216 and yet another Burmese woman said that “oppression from military
government” was missing.217 It did not appear that most of the participants had
considered this question before. The language of the legal definition may have also
been confusing or intimidating to individuals who were reading it for the first time.
Their responses could also illustrate a limitation with interviewing resettled refugees,
for whom the refugee system worked, even if they had not understood all of the
processes along the way. If I had interviewed individuals who had not been
recognized as refugees under IRL, I expect that I might have received more critical
responses to who should be considered a refugee.
E. Some refugee behavior is influenced by real or perceived benefits associated
with being a refugee.
Although refugees may not know the legal refugee definition, in some cases their
behavior may still be affected by real or perceived benefits associated with being a
refugee. Three in-depth ethnographic studies offer important insights into situations
when refugee behavior was directly affected by refugee status determination results or
the possibility of third country resettlement. Bram Jansen conducted fourteen months
of ethnographic fieldwork in Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya between 2004 and
2006, examining the dramatic impact that mass third country resettlement programs
had on the Somali refugees living there.218 Jansen described how bleak living
conditions in Kakuma, a need for peace and security, and information and remittances
received from abroad had led to a preoccupation with resettlement among refugees in
Kakuma. Because only a limited number of refugees were actually selected for
resettlement, “many refugees developed a belief that resettlement was something that
they could organize and achieve… need and vulnerability became intertwined with
opportunity, and thus subject to negotiation.”219
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Jansen gave many examples of how “identity became an issue of access to
opportunity:”220 Some Somalis changed their ethnicity during a new headcount based
on rumors of which groups were more likely to be resettled, other women claimed
insecurity or rape in order to qualify for resettlement under the UNHCR vulnerability
category, and community leaders with contact with NGO staff used their knowledge
and access to build a stronger resettlement case.221 In a similar ethnographic study
among Somalis in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya, researcher Cindy Horst explored
how the idea of resettlement buufis, a Somali word meaning longing or dream, had
turned into a phenomenon in Dadaab.222 Her study focused on how transnational
information and remittances affected daily life in Dadaab, with refugees’ hope for the
future focused on obtaining resettlement and leaving devastating effects for those
rejected from resettlement programs.223 Pointing to the idea of “refugee agency,” she
also acknowledged that this changing behavior was understandable given that
refugees are often not able to make decisions about their own lives. Put differently,
“if one accepts that refugees have a certain level of power and choice in determining
their lives and livelihoods,” then this would also include the ability to negotiate
resettlement.224
In Egypt, a 2007 ethnographic study examined how southern Sudanese were
changing the way they approached courtship, marriage, and even family planning “in
order to be added to a UNHCR-recognized file through marriage to qualify for
resettlement.”225 Limited options for work or local integration in Cairo led many
Sudanese to believe that resettlement to a third country was the only solution to a
better life, and many resorted to “extreme measures, even fraud” in order to increase
their changes of resettlement.226 A positive refugee status determination or
resettlement decision had become an important bargaining chip in marriage
negotiation. The title of the article, “Who Can Be Added,” was inspired by a play the

220

Id. at 578.
Id. at 578-583.
222
Cindy Horst, Buufis amongst Somalis in Dadaab: the Transnational and Historical Logics behind
Resettlement Dreams, 19 J. Ref. Stud. 143–157 (2006).
223
A subsequent point, related to refugee studies and durable solutions but not necessarily refugee
identity, was her exploration of the devastating impact that not receiving resettlement had on the
remaining refugees in the camp.
224
Horst, supra note 222, at 144.
225
Currie, supra note 166, at 71.
226
Id. at 84.
221

37

researcher had witnessed at a Sudanese school where young Sudanese children “acted
out a series of sketches on how to ‘add’ people to a UNHCR-approved file.”227 In this
community, the legal category of refugee and the policy of resettlement had a very
real impact not just on individual behavior, but on entire community cultural
practices.
Despite these three studies that provide important insight into how IRL and
policy categories can impact behavior, the academic research on the subject of
refugee behavior and fraud is limited. Jansen explained that refugee studies scholars
were reluctant to explore the ideas of refugee “cheating” for fear of the “possible
effect that research findings might have on the already vulnerable position of
refugees.” 228 Refugee scholars are assumed to have refugees’ best interests at heart,
and writing about refugee cheating might make states even less trusting of refugees or
threaten donor support for refugee services.229 Indeed this was one of my own
hesitations for writing a thesis that critiques IRL. At first it seems like critiquing IRL
could be arguing that refugees do not merit international protection. But the point is
not to question the severity of refugee situations but to question how and why these
situations are the only ones that are prioritized. Jansen summarized this tension
between research and advocacy by concluding:
Large resettlement schemes such as these have their effects on the camp
population in terms of a vastly expanding repertoire of behaviors adopted in
order to become eligible for them. Refugee cheating and maneuvering is
regarded as a taboo subject and treated merely as a bureaucratic complexity;
analyzing how identities are moulded around opportunistic ideals is thus in
large part an arbitrary exercise.230
The limited research on refugee behavior and cheating highlights the unique position
of fieldwork to capture aspects of refugee identity. In my fieldwork, when I asked
participants why they had registered as refugees, all mentioned that they signed up in
order to obtain some kind of benefits, such as food, medicine, or shelter. Two also
mentioned registering for security or obtaining an ID. Several volunteered
information about local residents (non-refugees) who tried to register to obtain
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benefits. When I asked if anyone had ever encouraged them to change their story or
emphasize certain parts in order to fit the refugee definition or obtain certain benefits,
all participants responded with an emphatic no. Each emphasized the importance of
telling the truth and being consistent in interviews. While this idea of not
emphasizing certain parts of a story runs counter to my experience with agencies who
provided legal advice to refugees, it may also reflect part of a sample bias among
resettled refugees whose cases were approved. It may also show that these refugees
understood their evaluation process to be based primarily on consistency and
credibility, not whether a testimony correlated with a legal definition.
F. Refugees have a strong sense that governments and the international
community should be responsible for refugee protection and solutions.
Toward the end of each interview, I asked participants who they thought should be
responsible for providing protection or solutions for refugees. There was a strong
sense in the responses that governments in countries of origin and asylum,
international organizations such as the UN and UNHCR, and the international
community in general should be responsible for refugees. Most participants answered
this initial question quickly, but upon further questioning about who should decide
who is a refugee or what should happen if two governments disagree – then most
participants did not have a specific response. It appeared that most were not used to
being asked or sharing their opinion about these policy-related questions. As with
other questions, some participants were able to generalize beyond their own
experience, while others were not.
The purpose in asking this question was to hear refugees’ ideas and try to get a
sense of whether they have had opportunities to give their input on these policies.
The purpose was not to evaluate the current international refugee system with a view
to proposing better solutions. The tendency to jump to solving the problems before
understanding them is something that both Chimni and Shacknove warn against.231
Like Shacknove, I am critiquing the fundamental assumptions of international refugee
law and “deferring for now a discussion of obligation and management.”232 This is
challenging because questions of international responsibility clearly lead to logistical
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questions of practice and implementation. But before proposing solutions, we first
need to ask the right questions. In this case, first I ask how refugees are defined
according to IRL and then how refugees understand their own identity and
experience. The way that refugees express their identity and understand their
experience is not limited to the boundaries of the Convention definition.
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IV. Constructing Refugee Identity
Having examined the international legal definition and explored how refugees
understand their identity and experience, I turn to the next questions: how can we
understand the relationship between refugee self-perception and the Convention
definition? And how does international refugee law influence our understanding of
who deserves international protection? As I outlined in Part III, refugees generally
understand and describe their own experiences in terms that are much broader than
the Convention definition. They tend to conceptualize the idea of refugee to reflect
their own experience. They also have very strong negative feelings about the term
refugee. Even as recognized or resettled refugees, many said they felt like the “worst
in society.”233 The uniqueness and diversity of their experiences is difficult to
capture, and in some cases may even be lost, under the common refugee label. They
are largely unfamiliar with the specific international laws that impact their lives, but
in some cases their behavior is shaped by real or perceived benefits they can derive
from the international refugee system. The refugees I interviewed also had a strong
sense that governments and the international community should be responsible for
providing protection and solutions for refugees.
In this chapter, I explore some of the consonances and dissonances between
refugee self-perception and IRL to better understand how and to what extent the
refugee is constructed as a specific identity through international law. Using the six
ideas from refugee perspectives outlined in Part III as the basis for analysis, I identify
three corresponding themes that contribute to the constructed refugee identity. First,
the relationship between legal and everyday language has played a significant role in
how refugees understand their own experience and how the general public understand
refugees. Second, given the diversity of refugee experiences, I evaluate the idea of
refugee group identity to understand the advantages and disadvantages of such a
conceptualization. Finally, I examine the power dynamics in the complex interplay
between law and politics that may impact refugee behavior and their expectations of
the international community. Examining each of these themes helps to understand
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how refugee identity is constructed, as well as how IRL influences understanding of
who deserves international protection.
A. The Role of Legal and Ordinary Language
I initially approached my research questions based on years of observing many ways
the word “refugee” is used in everyday language and the differences between those
uses and the legal definition. When interviewing refugees, the language they used to
describe their ideas of “refugee” tended to reflect their personal experience, not
necessarily a generalized conception of refugee.234 Their descriptions also aligned
more closely with the ordinary usage of the term, rather than the legal definition that
focuses on persecution. There are several possible explanations for this.
First, some of the refugees that I interviewed were still within one or two years
of arriving in the United States and starting a new life in the Chicago suburbs.
Resettlement is a difficult process – often much more difficult than refugees expect it
will be – and so some of the interview participants were clearly (and understandably)
focused on their family’s adjustment to their new life. Many did not appear able to
think outside their own circumstances to more general terms about refugee situations.
The way that participants described their ideas of refugee more closely resembled the
OAU definition or the public usage of the term than the 1951 Convention.
Second, it did not appear that many of the participants had been asked for their
ideas on refugee law or terminology before. They had clearly answered many
questions about their own story throughout the multi-year process of applying for
refugee recognition and resettlement. Most seemed a little surprised or unsure how to
respond when asked to think outside the parameters of their own experience in order
to consider policies or draw general conclusions. At the end of several interviews,
participants asked me how they had done or if they had answered correctly, even
though at the beginning of each interview I explained that there were no right or
wrong answers, and I was only interested in their opinions. This signaled to me that
refugees were not used to being asked for their opinion.
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Mainstream IRL scholars acknowledge that in “ordinary usage” the word
refugee is broader than the legal definition. Goodwin-Gill calls refugee “a term of
art,” noting that it means “someone in flight, who seeks to escape conditions or
personal circumstances found to be intolerable,” as well as someone who we perceive
deserves international protection.235 Scholars from other disciplines have also
recognized the limitations of the legal definition and have developed their own
working definitions of the term refugee.236 Many practitioners accuse IRL and the
international refugee system of perpetuating images of refugee dependency to the
point that the image has become “necessary for survival of the concept in theory and
individual in practice.” 237 In everyday use, the term refugee is “open to much
discussion and interpretation”238 and regularly used beyond its legal parameters.
This dissonance between everyday and legal use of the term refugee is not
unique to IRL. As a comparison, consider the term “genocide.” In everyday
language, genocide is thought or understood to mean a mass slaughter, usually
associated with political, historical, and even cultural connotations. But in order to
effectively prosecute perpetrators of genocide, international criminal law had to create
a legal definition of genocide. Legally, the term genocide is defined by one or more
of five specific acts that were “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.”239 This requires meeting several
definitional criteria: first, identifying the committed acts as one of the five that could
constitute genocide, then identifying the dolus specialis, or special intent, to destroy,
and, finally, identifying the targeted group as one of the four protected groups. This
makes it challenging to legally prove genocide, even in circumstances that the general
public would consider to be genocide.
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Consequently, dissonance between legal and everyday language is common
but significant. In the case of IRL, interpretation and application of terms obviously
has important ramifications for the individuals seeking asylum. An unclear definition
may help states justify applying the criteria as narrowly as possible to determine who
deserves protection or admission. New terminology in scholarship and media adding
modifiers to the noun refugee – such as environmental refugees or humanitarian
refugees – reflects the attempts to reinforce a limited understanding of refugee and
confine protection to only a select few. These different modifiers support the
perception that there are “real” Convention refugees and “other” kinds of refugees
and that the “true” refugee protected under the Convention is indeed a privileged and
exclusive position. Alternatively, there may also be some positive consequences to
the lack of clarity in the refugee definition. Mainstream IRL scholars argue that
though the basic premise for IRL has remained the same, the refugee definition has
evolved since its initial creation, changing to meet the needs of current refugee
situations or reflect changing cultural values. Some of the open-ended terminology
benefits asylum-seekers, not states. For example, the protected ground of “particular
social group” has evolved significantly since the 1951 Convention, with gender now
almost universally recognized as group.240
B. Challenges of Group Identity
In addition to legal and ordinary terms that impact how refugees are identified and
perceived, refugee identity is constructed by using a single legal term to describe a
group of individuals with vastly different experiences. While working with resettled
refugees in the U.S., we consistently noticed that refugees from one country did not
necessarily identify with refugees from another country simply because of their
common refugee legal status. On the contrary, some distanced themselves from other
refugee groups. My fieldwork also reflected a diversity of individual refugee
experiences that are difficult to capture with a single term or label. Scholarship in
refugee studies, particularly anthropology, has criticized the tendency to generalize
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refugee experiences.241 The individual nature of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention
and refugee status determination process may be an attempt to capture the individual
narrative, but from a logistical perspective it is simply impossible to initially consider
each individual story when describing refugees or providing assistance to them. In
some cases, individual refugees may have more to gain by uniting as a group. This
paradox of the individual versus the group parallels some of the tensions, strengths,
and critiques of traditional identity politics scholarship. Although “refugee” has not
been a typical category of identity politics, the comparison is helpful for
understanding what both refugees and non-refugees have to gain and lose by using a
group identity category.
In this section, I use the methodology outlined by Martha Minow in her 1996
work Speeches242 to identify the advantages and disadvantages of treating refugee as a
group-based category. I also reference how post-identity scholarship has attempted to
address some of the shortcomings of traditional identity politics.243 Like Minow, I
use the term identity politics to mean “the mobilization around gender, racial, and
other similar group-based categories in order to shape or alter the exercise of power to
benefit group members.”244 The basis for Minow’s analysis is Hillel’s famous
questions: “If I am not for myself, who will be for me? If I am not for others, what
am I? And if not now, when?”245 Minow starts by addressing the question of
representation in politics; she explores the question of who is qualified to speak on
behalf of others and also raises the issue of power dynamics in who gets to decide
what groups are represented. She argues that although in many ways identity politics
has been essential and even “inevitable responses to perceived oppressions,”246 we
also must move beyond the extremes of universalizing perspectives that ignore
individuality as well as specific individual perspectives that minimize the power of
groups. Minow confronts the controversy of identity politics, identifying the paradox
of a establishing a group identity in order to recognize individuality. She advocates
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that it is “time” to be for both ourselves and for others247 and suggests initiatives to
help individuals and governments reach this aim.
Group identity politics offer some advantages to the individuals both within
and outside the group. By affiliating with a group, identity politics can help
individuals overcome a sense of anonymity that they may otherwise feel. Over the
years, group politics has also given a voice to oppression or discrimination that may
not have been noticed or taken seriously in individual stories.248 In some cases this
increased awareness has also led to controversial policy measures that attempt to
correct injustices, such as quotas or affirmative action that seek to correct systemic
discrimination.249
Some parallel advantages can be drawn to the international refugee regime in
treating refugees as a group category. Without the refugee group identity, there
would arguably be no agency (UNHCR) devoted to refugee protection and perhaps
fewer aid organizations devoted to their assistance. On a government administrative
level, some kind of category or classification is necessary for making policy decisions
concerning funding for assistance or admission to a particular country. Generalizing
refugee experiences as part of a group category has also simplified a narrative that
likely helped to raise public awareness of the plight of refugees, increased donor
contributions for assistance and put pressure on governments to respond to refugee
situations. The magnitude of certain refugee situations – such as thousands of Syrians
fleeing violence250 – may also be more compelling than an individual story and more
likely to create public demand for a government or international response. Ideally, a
refugee group identity could also raise awareness beyond humanitarian aid for
refugees: it could lead to an examination of the causes behind refugee situations and
advocacy efforts for more preventative measures.
These advantages of group identity are also complicated by the nature of the
refugee category. Unlike other typical political identity categories such as race or
gender, refugee is not an intrinsic characteristic to any individual. It is a legal
category, defined by IRL, but interpreted and applied by various governments and
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agencies around the world. It is an assigned category, not an inherent one. Perhaps in
the post-World War II setting that inspired the 1951 Convention the concept of
refugee was more cohesive than it is today and refugee identity would have been less
contentious. But as a legal definition that about three quarters of the countries in the
world adhere to, there is a power imbalance between the entity assigning the category
and the individual being assigned the legal identity. This leads to potentially biased
decisions and challenges the idea that an independent and cohesive group identity
exists.
There are power dynamics at play throughout other areas of identity politics as
well, such as in assigning labels, creating policies, and deciding on representatives for
different groups. One of the critiques of identity politics is that the approach is
simultaneously both “too particular and too broad.”251 In being too broad, identity
politics claims that differences should not matter and equality is the goal. In being
too particular, identity politics has the tendency to “essentialize,”252 or focus on the
one characteristic that unites a group of people. In the process, it can reduce
individuals to that single characteristic.
This essentializing can happen with refugees as well. Even referring to
participants as “refugee from Bhutan” may reinforce a preconceived and
oversimplified image of refugee as a title to someone’s life. Reflecting on my
fieldwork, in hindsight I would start by simply asking participants to tell me little bit
about themselves. Though their refugee experience had certainly been a significant
part of their lives, I wonder how many would have voluntarily introduced themselves
as a refugee, rather than talking about their country of birth, profession, family status
or something else. In the context of a research study where participants have signed
consent forms and seen the title of the research project, it may be hard to uncover
their most natural answer about how they see themselves. If the project were to be
expanded in the future, it would interesting to explore how participants respond to an
open-ended question about identity.
This leads to another critique of identity politics that Minow raises: identity
politics ignores “inter-sectionality,” or the ability of a person to belong to more than
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one group.253 It also ignores the possibility of belonging to certain groups
temporarily, or at different times. This applies to refugees as well. Refugee status
was never intended to be a permanent status, and in most cases it is not a life-long
identity. Neither are many other identities. As Minow emphasizes, identities are
“fluid and contestable” and the real question is “why we ever forget this.”254 By
ignoring the reality that identities change and overlap, identity politics may also
inadvertently separate people, segmenting them into defined groups, rather than
uniting them to work together more effectively.255 The refugee label often lasts for
years; the Bhutanese that I interviewed had lived in refugee camps in Nepal for
eighteen years. For those in protracted refugee situations,256 the longer they remain a
refugee the more entrenched the label becomes. As they become more dependent on
international aid and lose the ability to make decisions for their life, there may be
little choice but to accept the given identity.
Minow also addresses the issue of power imbalance when she tackles the
question of representation. She asks “who can speak for whom,”257 noting that
increasingly people want a representative who looks like them. The characteristic of
identity politics to demand representatives who look the same as a particular group
reveals a “distrust about the ability of people to speak and stand in for those who
seem different than themselves.”258 In places where refugees live, many
organizations assisting them also hire “community leaders” as interpreters,
psychosocial workers, or other positions of leadership. This practice almost always
raises important questions about the extent to which community leaders, once they are
even identified, can accurately represent their respective communities.259 Within
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academic scholarship, the question of representation relates to available perspectives
and voices. In IRL, the issue is not whether the refugee perspectives are
representative, but whether the perspectives are even present. Throughout the
international refugee regime – from refugee status determinations to aid agencies to
government policies – refugee representatives are notably missing. There are few
cases where a refugee or former refugee holds a leadership position within the refugee
regime or where mechanisms are set up to allow refugees to feedback into the
system.260 The lack of refugee voices and representation in IRL is a major
shortcoming.
C. The Complicated Relationship Between Law and Politics
In this last section, I build on the ideas of legal language and group identity to explore
the complicated relationship between IRL and politics and how it often impacts the
lives of refugees. Much like Minow assessed the shortcomings of identity politics
based on the “paradoxical qualities of human separateness and connection,”261 postidentity scholars recognize and attempt to “articulate a set of strategies that
acknowledge our simultaneous and ambivalent desire to both affirm our identities and
to transcend them.”262 They also recognize that traditional identity politics cannot
capture our “complex experiences of law and culture,”263 thus leading them to explore
multiple and overlapping disciplines which may better express the nuances of
identity. By acknowledging that law is one of many “social discourses”264 among
politics and culture, post-identity scholars recognize that while “legal discourse is an
important site for struggle about the meanings of identities,”265 it is not the only
perspective. Legal discourse is particularly influential, however, because it involves
states and power. States possess the power – and often the monopoly of power – “to
particularly if they did not have the same background as their clients. Panel members explained that it
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protect, to punish, and seemingly to leave alone.”266 This is particularly true with
refugees, where the state, or an organization approved by the state, is the decision
maker of a refugee’s legal identity. Legal identities and legal language are important
because they can also allow governments to mask true political motivations and
intentions behind the seeming objectivity and neutrality of the law. International law
also may influence refugee behavior and create expectations of what governments or
the international community owes them, even though refugees may not be able to
identity the role that IRL played in creating these behaviors and expectations.
The relationship between law and politics is not easy to identify. International
law in particular can seem obscure and remote, even though it can have a very real
impact on behavior in our daily lives. This was evident in my interviews with
refugees, who may not be able to quote the Convention refugee definition but still
understand the significance of being called a refugee, even though they do not like the
term. A key example was when some interview participants shared that they believed
they were required to register as refugees in their secondary countries in order to
obtain certain benefits; they believed a friend or acquaintance when they told them it
was something they must do. In this case, refugees unintentionally accepted the
authority of an international organization as an implementer of international law.
If some participants believed that they were required to register as a refugee,
then it also follows that this understanding could have created expectations of what
assistance and benefits they thought they should receive as refugees. These
expectations may also explain why most participants felt a strong sense that other
countries, international organizations, and the international community were obligated
to protect and provide solutions for refugees. Although refugees could not name the
provisions or obligations for state parties to the Convention, they intuitively believed
that these obligations existed. When I asked one participant who should be
responsible for refugees in the case that his own government failed, he responded that
“countries with human rights” should be responsible.267 This showed me that IRL
and legal language influences refugees’ understanding of their own experience, even
though the connection is subtle and hard to identify. IRL’s influence was also
reflected in the field research studies in Kenya and Egypt where refugees tried to alter
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their status or behavior in order to increase their chances of third country resettlement.
In these cases, refugees seemed to understand resettlement programs as political or
humanitarian responses by governments, not necessarily policies based on legal
definitions. But the examples show how IRL and politics are interrelated and can
directly shape behavior and expectations.
In addition to law seeming remote and yet in reality intimately connected with
refugees’ lives, the perception of law as neutral can also allow politicians to mask
their motives behind particular policies. With refugees, this is often done through
bureaucratic labeling. Roger Zetter argues that the refugee label is used not simply as
a legal description, but rather as a convenient image that allows all of us, politicians
included, to separate ourselves from others – in this case, the refugee – and then to
apply policies to these others.268 He explains that labels are not simply neutral
categories; they “do not exist in a vacuum,”269 but rather they are the “tangible
representation of policies and programs,”270 or a political agenda translated into
another language. While states and organizations understandably need some kind of
mechanism for determining eligibility, providing assistance, and managing programs
designed for specific beneficiaries, he maintains that these “institutional needs
transform a story into a bureaucratic label.”271
Zetter also addresses the issue of power structures in making labels, noting
that it is almost always governments in the North who are making the global labels,
not governments from the South whom the labels often affect the most.272 Again this
underscores a power discrepancy between states when it comes to political influence
to create labels. Building on Zetter’s argument, Emma Haddad also explores the
complex realities behind the refugee label. 273 She argues that “although labels are
familiar and ubiquitous and often go unnoticed in the world of bureaucracy, the
‘refugee’ label is much more than a simple, innocuous tool of language.”274 In fact,
the label is “intensely political.”275 Building on history, international law and
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relations, she argues that refugee identity is constantly “in flux,” being “remade and
reinterpreted,” often determined by changing political factors that cause governments
to decide who is the enemy at any particular time.276
Ultimately Haddad argues that refugees are both created and caught in the
current international system, an inevitable consequence of sovereign states. Refugees
“occur in the gap between theory and practice” in a world where states do not always
protect the rights of their citizens, and the international community that does not
know how, or have the political will, to respond effectively to this failure.277
Similarly Chimni has argued that the “depoliticized approach” to the international
refugee regime with its focus on refugee law has had “serious practical and theoretical
consequences.”278 Because IRL law scholarship based on the “positivist tradition”
dominates refugee studies, the “possibility of engagement with politics” has been
severely limited.279 He argues that instead we need a fresh approach “rooted in the
principles of solidarity and internationalism” that is able to respond to the basic
tension in international law between “the right of sovereign states to specify
admission rules and the needs of people whose life and freedom are at risk.”280
Though the dynamics between politics and law are anything but clear, the
relationship is crucial for the refugee. The legal refugee definition has real political
consequences for states and real life consequences for refugees. And perhaps even
more importantly, the legal refugee definition has very real and even more devastating
consequences for those who are determined not to be refugees. Failed asylum
seekers, economic migrants, irregular migrants, environmental refugees, humanitarian
refugees, internally displaced persons, stateless persons and many others are too often
left in legal limbo without a system of protection or sense of responsibility from the
international community.
It is important to ask what role IRL plays in creating or influencing these
distinctions. Considering the significant implications of being recognized and
rejected as a refugee, we must ask if the refugee definition really does protect the
world’s most needy and vulnerable. Is the refugee definition, and the system created
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around it, a fair one? If so, then according to whom? The “international
community”? The state? The average citizen? The refugee? The rejected asylumseeker? Other stakeholders? Or has “refugee” remained a legal category primarily
for political or practical reasons, enabling rich states to successfully manage their
migration policies and processes under the seemingly admirable guise of human rights
and humanitarian law? Is IRL actually a tool to make states look and feel better about
offering protection to the most needy, fleeing what they determine to be bad or failed
states? Does it help excuse states from meeting humanitarian obligations elsewhere?
Does it distract from inhumane state practices and systemic injustices that cause and
contribute to displacement? While these questions have no easy answers, and various
individuals and states are sure to answer them differently, they are important
foundational questions that must be reconsidered when assessing the effectiveness of
IRL and the international refugee system.
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V. Conclusions
If there were no refugees in the world, if [we] could have peace, it could be better
than [to] be a refugee.
– participant 5, refugee from the Democratic Republic of Congo281
The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol are among the most widely
ratified international treaties, but questions about who is refugee remain far from
straightforward. Examining the history of IRL and development of refugee studies
provides important context for understanding the current state of the international
refugee regime. IRL developed in a specific post-World War II context that
prioritized individuals fleeing persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality,
political opinion, or membership in a particular social group in Europe before 1
January 1950. Though the geographical and temporal restrictions were removed in
1967 to give the Convention a global mandate, this was not without significant
ideological debate and may have even been influenced by the possibility of the more
generous refugee definition being developed by the OAU around the same time. As
refugee studies began developing into its own multidisciplinary field in the 1980s,
IRL continued to dominate the field. Many refugee law scholars point to the
evolution and development of various parts of the refugee definition as evidence that
IRL is capable of adapting to remain relevant and meet new circumstances.282
The paradox is that despite being designated as a special category of migrant
that deserves international protection according to IRL, most refugees do not feel
special in any positive sense. On the contrary, many feel singled out, alone, and have
a very negative association with the word “refugee.” For those seeking asylum or
those who have been denied refugee status, they would likely agree that “for many
persons on the brink of disaster, refugee status is a privileged position.”283 But from
the perspective of refugees, the status brings with it not only protection and privilege,
but also a feeling of separation from society, denigration, dependency, and
disempowerment.
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Many disciplines outside of law have studied refugees, exploring different
aspects of their experiences of flight, settlement in another country, adjustment, and
identity. Scholars who have tried to conceptualize who is a refugee have generally
been more generous than the legal definition. But few studies have explored how
refugees understand their own experience as refugees or their opinions about the legal
refugee definition. My fieldwork revealed that refugees’ conception of the word is
generally reflective of their own experience and broader than the legal definition; in
most cases their ideas of a refugee are more closely aligned with the OAU definition
or the public use of the word refugee than the Convention definition. While I cannot
generalize the results of my small sample of refugee interviews to speak for all
refugees, the interviews highlight refugee voices that are usually absent in IRL
literature. They also offer insight into the relationship between perceptions and the
legal refugee definition and raise questions about the role and influence of IRL.
One of these questions is whether the refugee definition is helpful and just,
given the diversity of refugee experiences and reasons that individuals may be
forcibly displaced or choose to leave their countries. This discussion often leads to
debates about modifying the Convention definition, perhaps broadening it to the OAU
definition that seems to be closer to capturing the general understanding of the word
refugee. Arguments about expanding the refugee definition immediately give rise to
logistical questions. If there are not enough resources or political will to care for
refugees as currently and narrowly defined, how could the international community
handle more refugees? After all, the broader OAU definition has not necessarily
meant better protection or solutions for refugees in Africa, particularly in the current
refugee system where the advantages of being recognized as a Convention refugee
allow for the possibility of third country resettlement, unlike the OAU definition.284 I
am not convinced that expanding the refugee definition is the best solution,
particularly if it is competing with other narrower definitions that offer better
benefits.285
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Focusing on expanding or reforming the Convention definition actually misses
the more important issue. I contend that in order to assess the accuracy of the refugee
definition, we must first question the underlying premise of IRL. IRL is predicated
on the assumption that states have a relationship and obligation to their citizens, that
persecution represents a breakdown of that relationship, and that a well-founded fear
of persecution on one of the five Convention grounds warrants international
protection more than any other fears or circumstances. Examining these assumptions
is a crucial first step to identifying the problems with, and created by, IRL and starting
to think about how to tackle them. Questions about the premises of IRL will
undoubtedly lead to conflicts of interests and values about the role of law, sovereignty
and state responsibility, and ethics of migration – some of the most fundamental
tensions in international law. Because of this, many mainstream scholars and
practitioners worry that questioning the premise of IRL and the Convention could
threaten the entire refugee protection regime. They argue that it is better to focus on
strengthening interpretation of the current definition, applying human rights law to
refugees, and advocating for states to fulfill their current responsibilities.286 While it
is outside the scope of this thesis to address many of these debates, I raise these
questions not to provide answers, but in an effort to move the debate toward more
useful directions.
Some potential steps to continue exploring IRL include, first, recognizing the
role that IRL has played in creating a particular type of refugee who deserves
international protection and, by extension, in deciding who does not deserve
international protection. IRL has directly contributed to the growing phenomenon of
“fortress states” by allowing states to apply the refugee definition restrictively and
therefore justifying not helping individuals without a valid asylum claim.287 However
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there may also be some positive aspects to the refugee definition being created by a
widely accepted international convention. The current refugee regime asks states
both to offer protection and seek durable solutions for refugees. IRL has perhaps
helped create a sense that states and the international community do have a
responsibility to assist some particularly vulnerable individuals. Refugee advocates
want to build on this sense of solidarity to reform the international refugee regime.288
But beyond solidarity and despite continuous reference to the need for durable
solutions, the current international refugee system has not successfully established
finding solutions as a priority for states and the international community as a whole.
As the Congolese refugee quoted at the beginning of the chapter states, ultimately it
would be better if there were no refugees. There seems to be an underlying
resignation in IRL that the world will always have refugees. Some scholars argue that
refugees are unavoidable in the current nation-state system289 while others contend
that the scope of human rights abuses that cause displacement is beyond our ability to
address.290 Chimni warned that the danger of being preoccupied with immediate
concerns can lead to the “tendency among those concerned with the problem of forced
migration to leave big questions like global justice for others to address.”291 But we
cannot defer the questions of global justice. If we do not ask questions about the root
causes of forced displacement, then we will only ever be treating its symptoms. More
importantly, this treatment may actually be exacerbating the root causes.
As we continue to unpack fundamental assumptions and the influence of IRL
on refugee identity, another potential step is to recognize that the legal term refugee
often seems divorced not only from the general usage of the term, but also from the
way that refugees understand their own experiences. Knowing the dominant role that
IRL has played in refugee studies in the past, it is time for IRL scholars to recognize
grounded in the concept of humanitarianism and in basic principles of human rights. In practice,
however, international refugee law seems to be of marginal value in meeting the needs of the forcibly
displaced and, in fact, increasingly affords a basis for rationalizing the decisions of states to refuse
protection.”
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the need for refugee perspectives and insights from other disciplines to provide a
richer, more complete understanding of who is a refugee. IRL could and should make
an intentional effort to incorporate refugee voices into its scholarship. One practical
way to do this is by engaging in multi-disciplinary analysis and methodology such as
fieldwork with refugees.
While refugees are the most qualified to speak to their own experience, no
single refugee voice can speak on behalf of all others refugees. Many refugee voices,
not just a token representative, must be heard. Refugees are most directly affected by
IRL, and so their voices should not only be included in the conversation but also help
to lead it. It is important that IRL begins to prioritize refugee leadership, not only
participation, in research, scholarship and law-making.
As actors within IRL, we could be more aware of the effects of the language
that we use. By oversimplifying the differences between refugees and other migrants,
we contribute to constructing a refugee identity that is based on a single narrative and
perpetuates the connotation of refugees as helpless and dependent. When we ask
“who can speak for others,”292 we should also recognize that we can play an important
role in joining and amplifying refugee voices; we should also limit when we speak on
their behalf to when there are power structures that silence their perspectives. Before
trying to think creatively about solutions and advocating for just and effective policy
changes, we should first acknowledge and investigate the complexities in refugee and
migrant stories, questioning and wrestling with the fundamental assumptions of IRL.
In this process, it is crucial that we not only be for others,293 but also commit to
ensuring that their own voices are heard.
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APPENDIX A: FIELD RESEARCH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
Tara Peters
Field Research
Tentative Questions
Name:

________________________________________________

Address:

________________________________________________

Interpreter:

________________________________________________

Introduction:
-‐ Explain purpose and scope of research
-‐ Review and sign consent forms
-‐ Explain interpreter confidentiality
Questions:
1. Name. Would you prefer that your name or a participant number be used in
this report?
2. Country of origin:
3. Date of Arrival in U.S.
4. Tell me about your journey from your country of origin. When did you leave?
Why?
5. Where did you go? How long did you expect to stay there?
6. Did you go through a RSD process?
7. How did you hear about this process?
8. Why did you decide to do pursue it?
9. Do you know why you were recognized as a refugee?
10. Why did you apply for RST? Do you know why your family was chosen?
11. When did you learn what a refugee is? How?
12. Throughout your interviews, did anyone encourage you to change your story
or emphasize certain parts in order to fit the refugee definition or obtain
certain benefits? Which part(s)?
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13. Do you know how international law defines “a refugee”? [Give Convention
definition].
14. Does this definition help explain why you left your country?
15. Do you think that there are any elements missing from the definition? What
are they? Why?
16. What do you think is the most important or defining part of being a refugee?
[Did not use this question]
17. How do you feel about the term ‘refugee’? Why?
18. Do you think there is a difference between terms like immigrant, refugee,
migrant, asylum-seeker? [Added during interviews]
19. Now that you live in the U.S., when someone asks where you are from, how
do you identify yourself?
20. What do you think are the greatest needs of ‘refugees’?
21. If you were to write an international definition of refugee, what would it be?
What term would you use?
22. Who do you think should be responsible to provide protection or make
solutions for refugees?
23. What criteria do you think countries should use to determine who deserves
protection? [Did not use this question]
24. In your experience, are refugees able to give input on policies that affect
them?
25. If not, why do you think this is the case? How could refugees have more
influence on laws and policies that affect them?
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APPENDIX B: PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

Informed Consent for Participation in Research Study

Project Title: Refugee Identity and the Limits of International Refugee Law294
Principal Researcher: Tara E. Peters
American University in Cairo
Graduate Student Services
AUC Avenue, P.O. Box 74
New Cairo 11835, Egypt
Email: tara.e.peters@gmail.com
Phone in U.S: (+1) 630.297.3255
Phone in Egypt: (+20) 1012063153

You are being asked to participate in a research study. The purpose of this research is
to explore refugees’ perceptions of identity and international refugee law. The
findings will contribute to the Principle Researcher’s (Researcher) Master’s Thesis
and may eventually be published in scholarly journals or online university records, or
presented at conferences or in class by the Researcher.
The expected duration of your participation is approximately two hours.
The procedures of the research will be as follows: The Researcher will interview you
in the location of your choice: either your home or a public space, such as a local
park. An interpreter will be provided if needed. The interview will be taped with a
hand-held audio recorder. Transcripts and digital files of these interviews are strictly
for the use of the Researcher and will not be released to any organization, institution
or individual. In the event that the possibility for additional use arises in the future,
the Researcher will seek your express consent prior to using any information you
provide.
The information you provide for purposes of this research will only be partially
confidential. Your name or other identifying information will not be used in any
294
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publications of this research, unless you agree for it to be used. The content of your
answers to questions and other information, such as your country of origin and
country of secondary asylum, may be referenced in reports or publications.
There are no expected risks associated with this research. There may be some
discomfort with the research as some of the interview questions are of a personal
nature and will sometimes ask you to recount details of your personal experience.
You are not required to answer any questions that make you uncomfortable, and you
can decline to answer as many questions as you would like. This will not have any
negative impact on you or the Researcher’s relationship with or treatment of you.
No compensation will be provided for participating in this interview.
Participation in this study is voluntary. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty
or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may discontinue
participation at any time without penalty or the loss of benefits to which you are
otherwise entitled.
If you have any questions about this research and your rights regarding participation,
please feel free to contact the Researcher, Tara Peters, at the email address or phone
numbers listed above.

By signing below, I acknowledge that I have read (or had the text orally interpreted to
me), understood, and agree to the above statements.
Participant Signature

________________________________________

Printed Name

________________________________________

Date

________________________________________

By signing below, I verify that I have provided oral interpretation of this consent form
in _____________________________________ (language).
Interpreter Signature

________________________________________

Printed Name

________________________________________

Date

________________________________________
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APPENDIX C: INTERPRETER CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT

Interpreter Confidentiality Agreement
Project Title: Refugee Identity and the Limits of International Refugee Law
Principal Researcher: Tara E. Peters
American University in Cairo
Graduate Student Services
AUC Avenue, P.O. Box 74
New Cairo 11835, Egypt
Email: tara.e.peters@gmail.com
Phone in U.S: (+1) 630.297.3255
Phone in Egypt: (+20) 1012063153

I, _____________________________________________________________ , agree
to work as an interpreter in the research study entitled ‘Refugee Identity and the
Limits of International Refugee Law.’
I have been informed of the content and details of the research and agree to participate
and keep all knowledge of the interviews confidential.
I understand that all information and/or verbal communication pertaining to
participants is strictly confidential, including names, family members’ names,
employment and education information, location of residence, and entire personal
history. I also agree that this information will not be recorded or written anywhere,
used in any public venues or on the Internet, nor shared with any third parties unless
by the participant’s express request.
By signing below, I acknowledge that I have read, understood, and agreed to
requirements of the above statements.

Signature

________________________________________

Printed Name

________________________________________

Date

________________________________________
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APPENDIX D: TRANSCRIBER AGREEMENT

Transcriber Agreement
Project Title: Refugee Identity and the Limits of International Refugee Law
Principal Researcher: Tara E. Peters
American University in Cairo
Graduate Student Services
AUC Avenue, P.O. Box 74
New Cairo 11835, Egypt
Email: tara.e.peters@gmail.com
Phone in U.S: (+1) 630.297.3255
Phone in Egypt: (+20) 1012063153
I, _____________________________________________________________ , agree
to work as a transcriber for the research study entitled ‘Refugee Identity and the
Limits of International Refugee Law.’ The procedures will be as follows: the
Researcher will give or mail me a flash drive that contains the digital files and
template for the interviews that I will transcribe. As I complete a transcription, I will
email the text of the transcript to the Researcher. After I receive confirmation from
the Researcher, I will delete the sent email with the text file. I will not save any
permanent copies of files on my any other computer or device, and I will also destroy
the flash drive once all interviews have been transcribed.
I have been informed of the content and details of the research and agree to participate
and keep all knowledge of the interviews confidential. I understand that all
information from interviews pertaining to participants is strictly confidential,
including names, family members’ names, employment and education information,
location of residence, entire personal history, and answers to interview questions.
I also agree that I will not duplicate the digital files of the interview recordings or
transcript documents. I agree that this information will not be recorded or written
anywhere, used in any public venues or on the Internet, nor shared with any third
parties unless by the participant’s express request.
By signing below, I acknowledge that I have read, understood, and agreed to
requirements of the above statements.
Signature

________________________________________

Printed Name

________________________________________

Date

________________________________________
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